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Comparative Judicial Attitudinalism: A
Preliminary Study of Judicial Choices in
Westminster Legal Systems
Zoe Robinsont

INTRODUCTION
The American preoccupation with explaining judicial decision making with statistics has long been antithetical to Westminster scholars. The notion that decisions can be explained in
quantitative terms by an empirical analysis of the statistical patterning of judicial votes is foreign to Westminster sensibilities.
Generally for Westminster scholars it is an unmitigated truth, or
at the least the presumptive mode of behavior, that judicial decisions are a result of the application of a priori canons, rules, and
principles, and that the judicial role is grounded in formal grants
of power, whether constitutional, statutory, or precedential (the
"legal model").' To put it another way, students of courts in
Westminster legal systems tend to assume that the legal model
of judicial behavior is the dominant mode of decision making,
t Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul College of Law. Thanks are due to Gerald
Rosenberg and Michael Robinson for comments on earlier versions of this Article. Special
thanks to Patrick Ferrell, Anindita Guha, and Joanne Moon for their outstanding research assistance.
1 On the legal model of judicial decision making, see generally Edward H. Levi, An
Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Chicago 1949). It is difficult to cite any specific Westminster source for the application of the legal model, given that the premise of this paper
is that the legal model is presumed in so much of Westminster legal scholarship. Rather,
a glance at any leading Australian, English, or New Zealand law journal-for example,
the Federal Law Review, the Melbourne University Law Review, or the Modern Law
Review--will suffice. It is important to note, however, that to claim Westminster scholars
have largely ignored empirical analysis of judicial behavior is not to claim that Westminster scholars have failed to recognize or acknowledge the judicialization of politics more
generally. There is a wealth of literature discussing the increased presence and prominence of the courts in Westminster legal systems (and, conversely, the decreasing role of
the parliament and parliamentary sovereignty). See generally, for example, Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: ConstitutionalCourts in Asian Cases (Cambridge 2003); Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the
New Constitutionalism(Harvard 2004); C. Neal Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder, The Global
Expansion of JudicialPower: The JudicializationofPolitics,in C. Neal Tate and Torbjirn
Vallinder, eds, The Global Expansion ofJudicialPower(NYU 1995).

209

210

72E UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2011:

whereby decisions are reached through an apolitical process. 2
Under this assumption of judicial behavior, the legislative and
executive branches are the main players, and courts are relegated to the bench, a subsidiary without power or interest in the
main game.
Yet, if Westminster scholars are inclined to take this view of
the courts generally, and judicial decision making specifically,
they should be aware that the American empiricism that dominates both legal and social-science scholarship on courts was itself a reaction to the legal model, reflecting a scholarly desire to
challenge long-held assumptions with empirical fact. Beginning
in the 1960s, American scholars have successfully challenged the
explanatory power of the legal model and demonstrated that it is
the ideological values of individual judges that most consistently
explain how judges resolve disputes in US courts, at least in the
civil rights context when the law is unclear (the "attitudinal
model"). 3
The purpose of this Article is to provide a first-cut look at
whether the implicit scholarly assumption that legalism is the
dominant mode of judicial behavior in Westminster legal systems
is empirically verifiable. It seems somewhat peculiar that in a
post-legal-realist genre, the idea of Westminster formalism persists without any attempt at verification. This Article, then, aims
to preliminarily ascertain whether the attitudinal model has any
explanatory power in the Westminster context. That is, this Article asks whether, in hard cases, 4 the ideology of Westminster
judges predicts their votes, so that conservative judges show sys2 The exception to this general statement is Canada, where significant empirical
work on judicial behavior has been undertaken, largely by C.L. Ostberg. See generally,
for example, C.L. Ostberg and Matthew E. Wetstein, AttitudinalDecision Making in the
Supreme Court of Canada(UBC 2007); C.L. Ostberg, Matthew E. Wetstein, and Craig R.
Ducat, AttitudinalDimensions ofSupreme Court Decision Making in Canada: The Lamer
Court, 1991-1995, 55 Polit Res Q 235 (2002).
3 On the attitudinal model and its application, see generally Jeffrey A. Segal and
Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (Cambridge 1993); Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (Cambridge 2002); Jeffrey A. Segal and Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the
Votes of US. Supreme Court Justices,83 Am Polit Sci Rev 557 (1989); Jeffrey A. Segal, et
al, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court JusticesRevisited, 57 J Polit
812 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, et al, Are Judges Political?An Empirical Analysis of the
FederalJudiciary(Brookings 2006); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Lisa Michelle
Ellman, Ideological Voting on FederalCourts of Appeals: A PreliminaryInvestigation, 90
Va L Rev 301 (2004). But see Jack Knight and Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40
Am J Polit Sci 1018, 1032-34 (1996) (a response to Segal and Spaeth's attitudinal-model
research, finding that precedent still shapes a majority of Supreme Court justices' votes).
4 A "hard case" is defined as a case without a "best" or "right" answer that is apparent from the text of the Constitution, statute, or common-law precedent.
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tematically different votes from those of liberal judges, or whether the legal culture imposes institutional constraints, so that
judges vote as neutral or apolitical umpires, rather than ideology-driven individuals.
While there certainly are other theories of judicial behavior
that may be helpful in a cross-jurisdictional analysis of decision
making, the dominance of the attitudinal paradigm as an explanatory theory of judicial behavior in the United States coupled with the strong similarities in institutional and political
norms across non-American Westminster legal systems suggests
that attitudinal decision making is as likely in the Westminster
context as it is in the United States. Confirming the viability of
the attitudinal paradigm in countries with similar common-law
heritage, then, may go a long way towards identifying a theoretical paradigm that can potentially facilitate broader crossjurisdictional and cross-cultural analysis of judicial decision
making. It seems evident that if scholars have a better idea of
what explains judicial behavior in jurisdictions with a similar
common-law heritage, then this might lead to the development
and refinement of a theory of decision making that has salience
as an explanatory theory of judicial behavior beyond the confines
of any particular jurisdiction.5 With the continued emergence of
new democracies across the globe, the increased judicialization of
politics, and the dominance of courts as the crucial decision makers in democratic systems, a unified theory of judicial behavior in
Westminster common-law jurisdictions could contribute significantly to current theories of constitutionalism and constitution
building in new democracies.
In order to assess the initial viability of the attitudinal model as an accurate descriptor of judicial behavior across Westminster legal jurisdictions, this Article employs one specific jurisdiction as a proxy for Westminster legal systems more generally,
and, focusing on one specific topic area, examines whether any
ideological effect is demonstrated.6 To this end, the Article examines the voting behavior of judges in Australia in the controversial area of immigration law from 2002-2009 (inclusive). The
Article hypothesizes that judges appointed by a conservative-led
Australian government will be more conservative than those appointed by a liberal-led Australian government; after all, it

6

See Ostberg and Wetstein, 55 Polit Res Q at 10-11 (cited in note 2).

6 This Article represents the first (and very small) slice of a larger comparative

project that aims to undertake a broad-scale comparative analysis of judicial behavior in
Westminster legal systems, across a number of topic areas.
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seems reasonable that a conservative prime minister would seek
to appoint judges of the same persuasion in order to ensure legal
interpretation most consistent with her political ideology.7 The
question, then, is whether this hypothesis holds true and, if so, to
what degree.8
The choice of Australia is deliberate: Australia represents
the Westminster jurisdiction with the least possibility of an ideological effect. This is because Australia remains the only Westminster (and indeed only Western) jurisdiction without a bill of
rights (either constitutional or statutory) at the federal level. The
Australian public and federal courts, then, have less of an entrenched culture of "rights talk" than other common-law jurisdictions, and the presumption that dominates US legal culturethat courts are the primary arbiter of individual rights-does not
hold in Australia. Evidence of an attitudinal effect in Australia,
then, indicates that ideological judging does occur in Westminster legal jurisdictions, and provides impetus for a more complete
study of comparative judicial behavior across Westminster jurisdictions more generally.
The study finds that the hypothesis is confirmed by the aggregate data, albeit with significantly less differentiation between conservative and liberal appointees than in the United
States. 9 That is, while conservative-Coalition appointees are
more likely to vote in favor of the government than their liberalLabor appointed counterparts, the association between politics
and judicial voting is weaker than might be anticipated. This
suggests that it would be interesting to know much more about
the relationship between politics and judicial ideology in Australia specifically, and Westminster systems more generally. In other
words, this limited preliminary study should be seen as a successful first-cut investigation of ideological judging in Westmin7 Australia is a constitutional monarchy with three branches of government at the
federal level: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. The
legislative branch in Australia is the Parliament, which comprises a lower house (the
House of Representatives) in which the prime minister (the leader of the party controlling
the lower house and the head of the executive branch) sits, and an upper house (the Senate). Australia functionally operates with a two-party system, similar to the United
States. The two parties are the ideologically conservative Coalition Party (a political
partnership party of the Australian Liberal Party and the Australian National Party) and
the ideologically liberal Australian Labor Party.
8 Of course, it is incredibly difficult to make overarching and generalized conclusions
about ideological decision making on the basis of one legal genre in one Westminster
jurisdiction. This study, then, represents a first effort at bringing empirical analysis of
judges and judging to bear on Australian and Westminster judicial behavior.
9 See notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
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ster legal systems and an indication that much more work needs
to be done in order to fully assess the role of politics in judging.
This Article will proceed in five Parts. Part I briefly outlines
the US literature on the attitudinal model that animates this
Article. This section also describes the current literature on the
courts in Australia. Part II outlines the hypotheses of the study,
as well as justifying the choice of forum (Federal Court of Australia) and decisional topic (immigration). Part III offers the
basic data, testing the hypotheses and outlining the methodology
of the study. Part IV discusses the results and speculates about
various reasons for the findings, and Part V outlines further research. Finally, Part VI provides a brief conclusion.
But first a note: this Article does not purport to claim that
ideology is the primary goal of judicial decision making. Rather,
the Article simply endeavors to uncover any subjective, nonrational, and value-charged aspects of judicial decision making that
are not prima facie ascertainable from the decisions themselves.
By bringing the capacities of quantitative analysis to bear on
judicial decisions in Australia specifically, and in Westminster
jurisdictions more generally, new perspectives and insights on
the judicial process can be highlighted. Westminster scholarship
on the courts, then, can move from its current theoretical institutional presumptions to descriptive institutional realities, whatever the results may demonstrate.
I. THE A'TITUDINAL MODEL
A.

The Study of Courts and the Attitudinal Model in the United
States

The hypothesis that politics and values could explain a
judge's voting behavior, proposed by legal realists,o was first
empirically examined by C. Herman Pritchett in his 1948 study
The Roosevelt Court.11 Focusing on the Supreme Court, Pritchett
10 See generally, for example, O.W. Holmes, Jr, The Common Law (Little, Brown
1881); O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv L Rev 457 (1897); Karl N. Llewellyn,
A Realistic Jurisprudence-TheNext Step, 30 Colum L Rev 431 (1930); Jerome Frank,
Law and the Modern Mind (Brentano's 1930); William W. Fisher III, Morton J. Horwitz,
and Thomas A. Reed, eds, American Legal Realism (Oxford 1993). See also L.L. Fuller,
American Legal Realism, 82 U Pa L Rev 429, 431 (1934) (offering a critique of Llewellyn
and realism as a whole).
11 C. Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court:A Study in JudicialPoliticsand Values,
1937-1947(Macmillan 1948). See also C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among
Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939-1941, 35 Am Polit Sci Rev 890, 890-91, 898
(1941).
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studied the decisions of the justices from 1937 to 1947 and concluded that the justices were "motivated by their own preferences." 12 Most exhaustively, and recently, Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth argued that the legal justifications for decisions posited by US Supreme Court justices are simply pretexts for the real
driving force behind the decisions-ideology. 13 After systematically analyzing decisions of US Supreme Court justices, Segal
and Spaeth concluded that "the Supreme Court decides disputes
in light of the facts of the case vis-a-vis the ideological attitudes
and values of the judges. Simply put, Rehnquist votes the way he
does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the
way he did because he [was] extremely liberal."14
Attitudinalists have employed various methodologies to
demonstrate that judicial voting is ideologically driven. The early
work of both Pritchett and Glendon Schubert used the actual
votes of judges to infer judicial ideology.15 Specifically, this early
work identified "judicial ideal points" (i-points) within a multidimensional ideological space, which represented each justice's
ideological preferences. Schubert, for example, found that "the
decision of the Court in any case will depend upon whether ...
the case dominates, or is dominated by, a majority of i-points."' 6
Similarly, David Rohde and Spaeth developed a multidimensional model that assumed justices had ideological preferences, again
measuring ideology by the nature of the votes cast by the justices, finding that a combination of ideological goals, rules, and situations influence judicial voting.' 7 This early methodology was
subject to intense criticism because of the circularity of the reasoning. That is, the measurement of judicial ideology was the
votes of the judges, which, in turn, was said to be the driving
force behind the voting outcomes.18
Building on this early work, attitudinal scholars of the 1980s
and onward attempted to operationalize judicial attitudes. How12 Pritchett, Roosevelt Court at xiii (cited in note 11).

13 Segal and Spaeth, Attitudinal Model (cited in note 3); Segal and Spaeth, Attitudinal Model Revisited (cited in note 3). See also Pritchett, Roosevelt Court (cited in note
11); Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind The Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme
Court Justices, 1946-1963 (Northwestern 1965); Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind
Revisited Psychometric Analysis ofSupreme CourtIdeology(Oxford 1974).
14 Segal and Spaeth, AttitudinalModel at 65 (cited in note 3).
15 See generally Pritchett, Roosevelt Court(citedin note 11); Schubert, JudicialMind
(cited in note 13); Schubert, JudicialMind Revisited(cited in note 13).
16 Schubert, JudicialMind at 38 (cited in note 13).
17 David W. Rohde and Harold J. Spaeth, Supreme Court Decision Making 134-57
(W.H. Freeman 1976).
18 See, for example, Segal and Cover, Ideological Values at 558 (cited in note 3).
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ever, because so few judges publically specify their preferred ideological outcome across all issues, political scientists have been
forced to identify a proxy for judicial ideology. Some studies attempted to estimate an ideological measure based on observable
attributes of judges, such as gender, age, race, religion, and ethnic background; however, these studies have had limited success.19 Relatedly, and more successfully, Segal and Albert Cover
developed an independent measure of the ideology of US Supreme Court nominees based on a content analysis of newspaper
editorials in four major newspapers that were written about the
nominees at the time of their nomination. 20 However, the measure has been shown to have limited predictive value outside the
civil liberties context. 21
The most obvious and widely used a priori measure of judicial ideology has been the party affiliation of the appointing president. 22 The rationale for this method is that, assuming presidents are rational actors who seek to maximize their policy outcomes, and given that federal courts make determinative decisions regarding the legal manifestations of any given policy
agenda, presidents will seek to appoint like-minded justices. At
least in the US context, this measure has generally proved to be
a good proxy for judicial attitudes, although there have been a
number of missteps by appointing presidents, the most notable
being conservative President Eisenhower's appointment of Earl
Warren as chief justice of the US Supreme Court, because Warren turned out to be one of the most liberal justices to ever serve
on the Court. 23
19 See, for example, Beverly Blair Cook, Sentencing Behavior of FederalJudges:
Draft Cases-1972,42 U Cin L Rev 597, 600 (1973) (examining whether age, military
service, offspring, or party identification, among other factors, explained the severity of
sentences given to draft offenders). See also Sue Davis, Voting Behavior and Gender on
the US. Courts ofAppeals, 77 Judicature 129, 131-33 (1994). For a criticism of using the
social background of judges as a proxy for ideology, see Sheldon Goldman and Austin
Sarat, eds, American Court Systems: Readings in JudicialProcess and Behavior 374
(W.H. Freeman 1978); S. Sidney Ulmer, Are Social Background Models Time-Bound 80
Am Polit Sci Rev 957, 964-66 (1986).
20 Segal and Cover, Ideological Values at 559 (cited in note 3).
21 See generally Segal, et al, Ideological Values Revisited (cited in note 3).
22 See, for example, Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman, 90 Va L Rev at 303 (cited in note
3); Sunstein, et al, Are Judges Political?at 3-7 (cited in note 3). See generally S. Sidney
Ulmer, Social Background as an Indicator to the Votes of Supreme Court Justices in
Criminal Cases: 1947-1956 Terms, 17 Am J Polit Sci 622 (1973); C. Neal Tate and Roger
Handberg, Time Binding and Theory Buildingin PersonalAttribute Models of Supreme
Court Voting Behavior, 1916-88, 35 Am J Polit Sci 460, 464-67 (1991); Stephen L. Wasby, The Supreme Courtin the FederalJudicialSystem (Nelson-Hall 4th ed 1993).
23 President Eisenhower reportedly stated that the appointment of Earl Warren as
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court was one of the "biggest damn-fooled
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While the vast majority of US scholarship on the courts has
focused on the Supreme Court, an increasing number of scholars
have begun to focus on the lower federal courts. As a result of the
increasing case selectivity of the Supreme Court, 24 the US Courts
of Appeals have become the de facto courts of final appeal. 25 Recognizing this shift, scholars have more recently begun to examine
adjudication at the lower federal court level. Unfortunately,
however, this scholarship has been largely normative, focusing
on the appropriate function of the lower federal courts, the theories of constitutional interpretation at the lower federal court
level, and the appropriate function of the intermediate appellate
court structure. Few legal scholars have undertaken empirical
testing of their normative theories at the lower court level, and
the majority of political scientists continue to focus their efforts
at the Supreme Court level.
There are, of course, a number of exceptions. Most notably,
Segal, along with Donald Songer and Charles Cameron, recently
considered the veracity of the legal, attitudinal, and hierarchical
models of decision making in the US Courts of Appeals, finding
that both the attitudes of the judges and Supreme Court doctrine
matter for decision making. 26 Relatedly, there is a strong emerging literature on the effects of panels on circuit court decision
making. Most recently, a University of Chicago project, led by
Cass Sunstein, examined both whether judges on federal courts
of appeals vote in accordance with their political ideology and,
more subtly, whether the political ideology of a circuit court

mistake[s]" he had made during his presidency. David M. O'Brien, Storm Center: The
Supreme Courtin American Politics 93 (W.W. Norton 4th ed 1996).
24 Following the enactment of the discretionary writ of certiorari in the Judiciary Act
of 1925, the Supreme Court has almost complete discretion over which cases to accept for
decision. See Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub L No 68-415, 43 Stat 936. The justices grant
certiorari selectively: in the 2006 Term, for example, there were 8,922 petitions for certiorari filed, with only 77 (or 0.9 percent) being granted review. See The Supreme Court,
2006 Term-The Statistics, 121 Harv L Rev 436, 444 (2007).
25 Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist, and Wendy L. Martinek, Judgingon a
Collegial Court: Influences on Federal Appellate Decision Making 89 (Virginia 2006);
Frank B. Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 2 (Stanford 2007); Sunstein, et al, Are JudgesPoliticalat3 (cited in note 3).
26 Jeffrey A. Segal, Donald R. Songer, and Charles M. Cameron, Decision Making on
the U.S. Courts ofAppeals, in Lee Epstein, ed, Contemplating Courts 227, 238-44 (CQ
1995). See also Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-AgentModel of Supreme Court-CircuitCourt Interactions, 38 Am J Polit Sci 673, 692-94 (1994); J. Woodford Howard, Courts ofAppeals in the
FederalJudicialSystem: A Study of the Second, Fifth, and Districtof Columbia Circuits
161-66 (Princeton 1981); Frank B. Cross, Decisionmakingin the US. Circuit Courts of
Appeals, 91 Cal L Rev 1457, 1462-71 (2003).
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judge's panel colleagues affects that judge's vote. 27 The authors
found that, generally, judges appointed by Democratic presidents
and judges appointed by Republican presidents vote differently,
and that, in many significant areas, a judge's ideological tendencies are dampened when sitting with two judges of another political party and amplified when sitting with two judges of the
same political party.2 8
B.

The Study of Courts in Australia

In contrast to the US literature on the judiciary, the Australian academy, both legal and political science, has for the most
part ignored the scholarship on the attitudinal model, as well as
quantitative techniques more generally. While legal scholars do
arguably appreciate both the politically-charged environment in
which many judicial decisions are reached, as well as the potential for the courts to serve as forums for political contests, the
focus of legal academics is on the end result, that is, the resulting
decisions and emanating doctrine, thereby treating judicial decisions as "atomized outputs." 2 9 Australian political scientists have
historically left the study of courts to legal scholars. Instead, political science in Australia has been primarily concerned with the
political branches of government and related functions such as
elections, voting, and interest groups.3 0 This historical dearth of
social-sciences research on the judiciary (both federal and state)
is evident upon review of Australia's leading political science
journal, the Australian Journal of PoliticalScience. A search of
the journal yields only ten articles and three book reviews on the
Australian judiciary, all relating to the High Court of Australia, 31
all published after 1992, with four by a single author. 32 None of
27 See Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman, 90 Va L Rev at 303, 319-27 (cited in note 3);
Sunstein, et al, Are JudgesPolitical?at 8-9 (cited in note 3).
28 See Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman, 90 Va L Rev at 302-10 (cited in note 3); Sunstein, et al, Are Judges Political?at 1-16 (cited in note 3).
29 Jason L. Pierce, Inside the Mason Court Revolution: The High Court of Australia
7T-ansformed l5 (Carolina Academic 2006).
30 Brian Galligan, Politics of the High Court: A Study of the JudicialBranch of Government in Australia 3 (Queensland 1987).
31 Note that the High Court sits at the apex of the Australian judicial system. On the
High Court in the Australian system of government, see L.F. Crisp, Australian National
Government75-78 (Longman 5th ed 1983).
32 The ten substantive articles are Katharine Gelber, High Court Review 2005: The
Manifestation of Separation of Powers in Australia, 41 Austl J Polit Sci 437 (2006);
Katharine Gelber, High Court Review 2004: Limits on the JudicialProtection of Rights,
40 Aust1 J Polit Sci 307 (2005); Haig Patapan, High Court Review 2002: The Least Dangerous Branch, 38 Austl J Polit Sci 299 (2003); Haig Patapan, 1igh Court Review 2001:
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these articles are empirical. Further, there exist only five monographs on the Australian courts as political institutions, again
all examining the High Court.
The first monograph on the Court as a political body was
Brian Galligan's 1987 book, The Politics of the High Court, in
which Galligan explores the development of the Court's judicial
review power in a broader political context. 33 Conversely, David
Solomon's 1992 book, The PoliticalImpact of the High Court, and
1999 follow-up, The PoliticalHigh Court, attempt to demonstrate
not the political nature of judicial behavior, but the impact that
judicial decisions have on political decision making and politics
more generally. 34 Haig Patapan's 2000 volume, JudgingDemocracy: The New Politics of the High Court of Australia,overviews
several significant judicial developments of the 1980s and 1990s
and concludes that the post-1980s High Court has a tendency to
judge Australian democracy-that is, Patapan claims that the
High Court was prepared to impose its own vision of democracy
on the state. 35 Again, all of the forgoing volumes are normative,
with none undertaking any form of empirical analysis. The final,
and most recent, volume on the political Australian judiciary is
Jason Pierce's 2006 monograph Inside the Mason Court Revolution, in which Pierce attempts to demonstrate that the High
Court of the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s shifted from a Court
that conceived its role as one of orthodox judicial decision making
to one that conceived of itself as a normatively preferable institution for the decisions concerning deep political issues.36 Basing
Politics,Legalism and the Gleeson Court, 37 Aust1 J Polit Sci 241 (2002); Russell Smyth,
Historical ConsensualNorms in the High Court, 37 Austl J Polit Sci 255 (2002); Jason L.
Pierce, Interviewing Australia's SeniorJudiciary,37 Aust1 J Polit Sci 131 (2002); Russell
Smyth, The 'Haves'andthe 'Have Nots- An Empirical Study of the Rational Actor and
Party CapabilityHypothesis in the igh Court 1948-99, 35 Austi J Polit Sci 255 (2000);
Haig Patapan, Separation of Powers in Australia, 34 Aust1 J Polit Sci 391 (1999); Haig
Patapan, Rewriting AustralianLiberalism: The Iflgh Court'sJurisprudenceof Rights, 31
Austl J Polit Sci 225 (1996); James Warden, Federalismand the Design of the Australian
Constitution,27 Aust1 J Polit Sci (Special Issue) 143 (1992). The three book reviews are:
Tom Round, Book Review, 38 Austl J Polit Sci 153 (2003) (reviewing Brian R. Opeskin
and Fiona Wheeler, eds, The AustralianFederalJudicialSystem (Melbourne 2000)); John
Doyle, Book Review, 36 Austi J Polit Sci 389 (2001) (reviewing Haig Patapan, Judging
Democracy: The New Politics of the High Court ofAustralia (Cambridge 2000)); Peter H.
Russell, Book Review, 35 Austl J Polit Sci 542 (2000) (reviewing David Solomon, The
PoliticalHigh Court:How the High CourtShapes Politics(Allen & Unwin 1999)).
3 See generally Galligan, Politicsof the High Court(cited in note 30).
34 David Solomon, The Political High Court: How the igh Court Shapes Politics
241-46 (Allen and Unwin 1999).
3 Haig Patapan,Judging Democracy: The New Politics of the High Court ofAustralia, 178-79, 191-93 (Cambridge 2000).
36 Pierce, Mason Court Revolution at 4 (cited in note 29).
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his findings on extensive interviews with Australian federal
judges, Pierce's volume is the only book on the Australian courts
that employs empirical research to investigate what motivated
the judges of the High Court at that time.37
While Pierce's book is the only monograph to undertake an
empirical analysis of the High Court, a small handful of articles
have done so. From 1966 through 1969, in an attempt to demonstrate the broader applicability of his theory of judicial behavior,
US scholar Schubert undertook an empirical analysis of the voting behavior of High Court justices. 38 Using the same methodology as applied in attitudinal analyses of US Supreme Court justices, 39 Schubert analyzes decisions of the Dixon High Court,
from 1951 to 1961, examining three key variables-background
of the justices, participation in decisions, and voting behavior-in
an attempt to determine whether personal attitudes and/or institutional aspects of the Australian judiciary motivated the votes
of the various justices. In addition, in the early 1970s Australian
constitutional lawyer Tony Blackshield drew on Schubert's work
to undertake an empirical analysis of High Court decisions from
1964-1969 in an effort to bring to bear new perspectives on judicial decisions in Australia.40 However, similar to Schubert's work
on the US courts, the methodology employed by both Schubert
and Blackshield is subject to criticism, and there have been no
subsequent studies updating their methodology or building on
3 See Andrew Lynch, The Once and Future Court?, 35 Fed L Rev 145, 147 (2007)
(book review).
38 See generally Glendon Schubert, The High Court and the Supreme Court: Two
Styles of JudicialHierocracy(paper presented to annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sept 10, 1966), noted in A.R. Blackshield, QuantitativeAnalysis:
The High Court ofAustralia, 1964-1969, 3 Lawasia 1, 9 n 18 (1972); Glendon Schubert,
JudicialAttitudes and Policy-Making in the Dixon Court, 7 Osgoode Hall L J 1 (1969);
Glendon Schubert, Judges and PoliticalLeadership, in Lewis J. Edinger, ed, Political
Leadershp in IndustrializedSocieties: Studies in ComparativeAnalysis 220 (Wiley 1967)
(comparing judicial behavior in the United States, Australia, the Philippines, and Japan);
Glendon Schubert and David J. Danelski, eds, Comparative JudicialBehavior: CrossCulturalStudies ofPoliticalDecision-Makingin the East and West (Oxford 1969); Glendon Schubert, Opinion Agreement Among High CourtJustices in Australia,4 Austl & NZ
J Socio 2 (1968) (making statistical observations about judicial behavior, including justices' references to each other in opinions).
3 See notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
40 See, for example, Blackshield, 3 Lawasia at 1 (cited in note 38). See generally A.R.
Blackshield, X/YZ/N Scales: The High Court of Australia, 1972-1976, in Roman Tomasic, ed, UnderstandingLawyers: Perspectives on the Legal Professionin Australia 133
(Allen and Unwin 1978) (the follow-up work to Blackshield's first work cited in this note).
Interestingly, Blackshield notes in the first footnote in his 1972 article that the article is
a small part of a larger work; however, this larger work was not subsequently published.
Additionally, neither of Blackshield's articles was published in Australian journals, perhaps indicating a suspicion of empirical scholarship concerning courts in Australia.
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their conclusions. 4 1 The only empirical scholarship on the Australian judiciary since the 1970s, apart from Pierce's book, has
been a handful of papers analyzing various aspects of High Court
decision making by economist Russell Smyth. Smyth has published three papers on the High Court: one examining the effect
of internal institutional norms within the High Court on judicial
behavior; 42 another, drawing on the seminal work of Marc Galanter, examining the effect of litigant experience and resources
on outcomes in the High Court; 43 and a third, with Paresh Narayan, attempting to explain what causes dissent on the High
Court.44
Smyth has also undertaken the only empirical assessments
of the Federal Court of Australia. In two papers, Smyth, with
Mita Bhattacharya, examines judicial citations in the Federal
Court to analyze the determinants of judicial prestige in the
Federal Court, 45 and in another, examines whether the outputs
of Federal Court judges decrease with the increasing age of the
judge. 46 Neither paper attempts to contextualize the Federal
Court of Australia as a political institution. Indeed, there exists
no literature on the Federal Court that places it in a broader political context, nor any examining or attempting to explain the
nature of judicial decision making on the court.
II. HYPOTHESIS
The puzzle that arises from the above overview of the Australian literature on the Australian federal courts is why more
scholarship does not exist on Australian courts as political institutions. One possibility was suggested above: that political scientists tend to leave the study of courts to constitutional scholars.
Perhaps because political scientists find the study of democratic
institutions more compelling, they consider courts part of the
lawyers' domain, or the Australian courts only recently became
41 See note 12 and accompanying text.
42 Smyth, 37 Austl J Polit Sci (cited in note 32).
43 Smyth, 35 Austl J Polit Sci (cited in note 32).
44 Paresh Kumar Narayan and Russell Smyth, What Explains Dissent on the High
CourtofAustralia?An EmpiricalAssessment Using a CointegrationandErrorCorrection
Approach, 4 J Empirical Legal Stud 401, 420-22 (2007).
45 See Russell Smyth and Mita Bhattacharya, What Determines JudicialPrestige?
An EmpiricalAnalysis for Judges of the FederalCourt ofAustralia, 5 Am L & Econ Rev
233, 234-35 (2003).
46 Russell Smyth and MVita Bhattacharya, How Fast Do Old Judges Slow Down? A
Life Cycle Study ofAging andProductivityin the Federal Court ofAustralia, 23 Intl Rev
L & Econ 141, 142 (2003).
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involved in matters of public policy. With the study of courts left
to lawyers, it is unsurprising that they have not been examined
in a broader political context. In the first instance, in contrast to
the publically-available datasets on the courts in the United
States, there are no comprehensive datasets on decisions, voting
patterns, outcomes, or judicial backgrounds available for Australian courts, perhaps explaining why only very few articles
have taken a behavioral approach to Australian courts. 47 More
likely, however, the explanation lies in the fact that the legal intellectual milieu in Australia remarkably remains pre-legalrealist and pre-behavioralist. 48 Australian legal scholars seemingly remain wedded to the legal model of judicial behavior, unquestionably accepting the theory that judges decide cases
through a systematic application of externally determined law.
For Australian legal scholars, judicial behavior is not contingent
on attitudes, but on the application of the law to the facts as presented, and where there is a gap in the law, the relevant law
serves as an objective constraint on judicial discretion. 49
The problem, then, is not only the dearth of empirical scholarship on judicial behavior in Australia, but also that much of
the existing scholarship on courts in Australia simply assumes
the veracity of the legal model.50 Even if Australian judges do
differ markedly from their American counterparts in their decisional behavior and are in fact constrained by the legal model of
decision making, this has yet to be extensively tested and empirically verified. Indeed, the scholarship that does examine attitudinal voting in Australian courts is arguably out of date (that is,
employs methodologies long since rejected in the US scholarship), and its focus on the High Court does not, to a large degree,
reflect the current primary locus of decisional authority in the
Australian federal judiciary, which arguably rests with the Federal Court, not the High Court.
A.

Grounding the Hypothesis

Before proceeding to the hypothesis proper, it is necessary to
specify a number of choices made in this Article, specifically the
choice of forum and case type, as well as the proxy selected for
identifying judicial ideology.
47 See Pierce, Mason CourtRevolution at 16-17 (cited in note 29).
48 Id at 16.
49 See generally id.

5o Excluding, of course, the scholarship outlined in Part I above.
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1. Choice of forum.
This Article examines the applicability of the attitudinal
model of judicial behavior by analyzing the votes of the justices of
the Federal Court of Australia. The reason for this choice of forum is reflective of both institutional and political shifts in Australia that have affected the nature of litigation in the federal
courts.
Over the past three decades, the Australian federal judiciary
has witnessed significant institutional changes. In 1976, the
Federal Government passed the Federal Court of Australia Act,
creating the Federal Court of Australia.51 The Federal Court is
an intermediate federal court, designed to hear first instance
matters arising from federal statutes and the Australian Constitution, 52 as well as appeals from decisions of single judges of the
Federal Court, decisions of the Supreme Courts of the Australian
Capital Territory and Norfolk Island, and certain decisions of
Australian state supreme courts exercising federal jurisdiction. 53
Further, in 1986 the Federal Government enacted the Judiciary Act, which required litigants to apply for leave to appeal to
the High Court, thereby enabling the High Court to control its
own docket.54 As a consequence, appeals to the High Court have
decreased significantly,5 5 resulting in the Federal Court effectively becoming the court of last resort for the majority of litigants
and, therefore, the majority of contested legal issues at the federal level. Indeed, in response to this growth in litigation at the
Federal Court level, the number of sitting justices has increased
from twenty-two in 1977 to forty-nine in 2008.56 The Federal
Court, then, is a core political institution that functions not only
as an enforcer of societal norms, but also as a creator of public
51 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). Note that hearings before the Federal
Court commenced on Feb 1, 1977.
52 The exception to the Federal Court's constitutional jurisdiction is where the Constitution specifies that the High Court will have original jurisdiction. See Aust1 Const
§ 75.
53 For detailed information about the Federal Court, see generally Federal Court of
Australia Homepage, online at http://www.fedcourt.gov.au (visited Sept 9, 2011).
54 Following the enactment of the Judiciary Act 1984, no appeal may proceed to the
High Court without the Court granting leave to appeal. See Judiciary Amendment Act
(No 2) 1984 (Cth). As with certiorari in the US Supreme Court, leave to appeal enables
the High Court to control which cases it reviews. See Judiciary Act of 1925, 43 Stat 936
(cited in note 24).
55 See Pierce, Mason Court Revolution at 38-40 (cited in note 29).
56 See Federal Court of Australia "Judges," online at http: //www.fedcourt.gov.au/
aboutct/jj.html (visited Sept 9, 2011).
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policy and in a number of key areas, it is the Federal Court that
defines and develops principles of law and policy that directly
affect a majority of Australians.
In addition to these significant institutional changes, over
the past three decades there have been considerable political developments in Australia that have resulted in legal challenges of
a more politically charged nature being brought before the
courts. Generally, individual rights have been slowly developing
in Australian legal culture, and since the early 1980s, many
statutory regimes have been developed or amended to include
provisions by which affected persons can challenge governmental
action in the federal courts.5 7 These rights-grounded claims, coupled with an increasingly charged racial milieu that grew out of
hard-line policies on Indigenous affairs and immigration, has
meant that the nature of the matters brought before the courts
are, more than ever before, ideologically charged-that is, matters on which ideologies, as well as reasonable minds, may diverge. The responsibility for these statutory challenges typically
rests with the Federal Court, with statutes enshrining the right
of litigants to be heard before a single-justice Federal Court and,
if the litigants do not prevail, a right of appeal to the court's appellate division. While there may be a theoretical right to appeal
to the High Court, the probability of a litigant succeeding on an
application for leave to appeal is small, meaning that more often
than not, the appellate division of the Federal Court is the court
of last resort.58
2. Choice of case type.
This paper examines the voting behavior in cases involving
appeals to the appellate division of the Federal Court from adverse refugee and asylum claims pursuant to the Migration Act
1958 (immigration cases).59 There are three key reasons for focusing on immigration.
First, immigration in Australia is animated by racial issues
and is therefore a politically polarizing topic. During the late
57 See, for example, Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1976 (Cth), § 44.
58 In the year 2006-07, there were approximately 800 applications for leave to appeal
to the High Court, with 65 applications granted. See High Court of Australia, Annual
Report 2006-07, 87-88 (2007).
59 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) §§ 476, 476A, 476B, as amended by Migration Legislation
Amendment Act 2001 (Cth). For the history of iunmigration legislation in Australia, see
generally Kim Rubenstein, Citizenship,Sovereignty and Atgration:Australia'sExclusive
Approach to Memberslup of the Community, 13 Pub L Rev 102 (2002).
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1990s and early twenty-first century, the Federal Government,
under the leadership of the conservative-leaning Coalition Party,
openly pushed an anti-immigration policy. Particularly given the
context of the Iraq War, the issue divided the nation and resulted
in violence and riots. 60 Immigration, then, is an issue over which
people, including justices, can divide according to preferred policy.
Second, under the Migration Act, as amended in 2001, appeals from adverse decisions of the relevant government tribunal
involving refugee and asylum claims must be filed in the Federal
Court rather than the High Court. 6 1 As with any other matter,
an appeal from a decision of the appellate division of the Federal
Court can be filed with the High Court; however, leave to appeal
is rarely given. This restricted access to the High Court means
that the Federal Court's immigration docket is both significant in
size and in its finality.
Third, amendments to the Migration Act in 2001 resulted in
an extremely restrictive statutory regime. Under the current
statutory scheme, judges have limited discretion and, therefore,
limited scope to impose any personal ideology. If the data evidences attitudinal voting under such a rigid statutory regime, it
is arguable that attitudinal voting is likely more widespread.
That is, because immigration is such an ideologically charged
topic, it would be expected that, whenever a hard case arises, 62
judicial political preferences may be determinative. Conversely,
if no difference between liberal and conservative judges is evi60 On Dec 11, 2005 a group of five thousand mostly white Australians gathered at
Bondi Beach in Sydney, an Australian landmark, to protest perceived bullying in the area
by gangs composed primarily of youths of Middle Eastern descent. Violence broke out
after a group of the protesters chased ten men of Middle Eastern descent and assaulted a
young Muslim family. The following days saw retaliatory violence across the eastern and
western suburbs of Sydney, the subsequent unprecedented shutdown of all Sydney
beaches, and the imposition of a curfew. For newspaper coverage of the incident, see
Retaliatory Violence in Sydney's South, The Age (Dec 12, 2005), online at http://www.the
2
2
age.com.au/news/national/retaliatory-violence-in-sydneys-south/2005/1 /1 /113423595
6260.html (visited Sept 9, 2011); Yvonne Abraham, On the Beach: Why the Recent Riots
in Australia Should SurpriseNo One, Boston Globe K1 (Dec 25, 2005). For an interesting
discussion of the divisive nature of former Prime Minister John Howard's antiimmigration stance, see Ross Gittins, Back-Scratchingat a NationalLevel, Sydney Morning Herald (June 13, 2007), online at http://www.smh.com.au/news/opinion/back
scratching-at-a-national-level/2007/06/12/1181414298095.htnl (visited Sept 9, 2011).
61 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) §§ 476, 476A, 476B, as amended by Migration Legislation
Amendment Act 2001 (Cth). For the development of the system of immigration appeals in
Australia generally, see, for example, John Power, The Executive, the Judiciary, and
Imnigration Appeals in Australia, in C. Neal Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder, eds, The
GlobalExpansion ofJudicialPower101 (NYU 1995).
61 See note 4.
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dent in such an ideologically fraught area, then it could be that
the legal model dominates judicial decision making in the Australian Federal Court.63 In this sense, then, immigration is a particularly good test for the traditional scholarly presumption that
Australian judges follow the legal model.
3.

Choice of proxy.

In order to determine the ideology of each Federal Court justice who heard immigration appeals between 2002 and 2009, it is
necessary to identify a proxy by which to determine that ideology. The chosen proxy is party affiliation of the appointing prime
minister. 64 All eighty-six judges in the dataset were scored as
either Coalition (taken to be conservative) or Labor (taken to be
liberal).65 For the years 2002-2009, there were forty-seven judges
identified as Labor (that is, ideologically-liberal appointees) and
thirty-nine as Coalition appointees (that is, ideologicallyconservative appointees).
The underlying assumption is that prime ministers appoint
judges with similar ideological tendencies. It is difficult to support this assumption except by logic because so little is known
about the appointment process. What is known is that the constitutional power to appoint federal judges rests with the governorgeneral in council, which, in effect, means that the prime minister in conjunction with the federal attorney general recommends
to the cabinet any appointees.6 6 Apart from federal legislation
governing the qualifications of any appointees-relevantly that
any appointee to the Federal Court must have five years of legal
experience-there is no further guidance on the appointment
process.6 7
63 It could also mean that this particular statute is particularly constraining given
the very little discretion afforded judges under the statutory immigration regime more
generally.
64 Similar to the United States, Australia effectively has a two-party system, with the
Labor Party and the Coalition Party (a long-standing alliance between the Liberal Party
and the National Party) dominating in the polls and Parliament. See note 7.
65 This is a particularly crude measure of political ideology since it is unlikely that all
Labor appointees will be liberal in their political preferences, and all Coalition appointees
will be conservative in their political preferences. Therefore, it is likely that any relationship between voting in immigration cases and ideology identified in this study understates the true impact of ideology on voting behavior. Thanks are due to Gerald Rosenberg for this helpful point.
66 George Winterton, Appointment of FederalJudges in Australia, 16 Melb U L Rev
185, 185-8 (1987).
67 See Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) § 6. See also Winterton, 16 Melb U L
Rev at 186 (cited in note 66).
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It is difficult to conclusively state, then, that appointments
are necessarily political. However, what can be said is that, if the
appointing prime minister is presumed to be a rational actor who
seeks to have his policy preferences upheld in any judicial decision, he will seek to appoint judges who are of similar ideological
tendencies in order to secure, so far as possible, this outcome.6 8
4.

Choice of time.

Finally, a brief note on why the years 2002 to 2009 were selected for the preliminary analysis of Federal Court voting. The
year 2002 represents the first year that the 2001 amendments to
the Migration Act were operational; therefore, judges were operating under an extremely restrictive statutory regime, meaning
that any results found are likely to hold more generally (given
that the immigration regime represents one of the most, if not
the most, discretion-bound statutory schemes in Australia).
B.

Hypothesis

The central hypothesis of this Article examines the central
question of whether Australian judges vote according to their
personal political ideology. The hypothesis can be stated thus:6 9
HI: In ideologically contested cases, a judge's voting behavior can be predicted by the party of the appointing
prime minister. Coalition appointees vote in favor of the
Government (that is, ideologically conservative), and Labor appointees vote in favor of the individual (that is, ideologically liberal) in the area of immigration.
III. DATA AND RESULTS
For the purposes of this study, every federal court immigration case decided between 2002 and 2009 was collected. The cases were drawn from the Federal Court of Australia database by
searching for "immigration" and "migration." Notably, each
judge's associate (law clerk) effectively codes all published decisions by inserting relevant "catchwords" into the header of the
68 The notion of the politician as a rational actor is strongly supported in the social
science literature. See generally David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection
(Yale 2d ed 2004).
69 This hypothesis was drawn from Sunstein, Schkade, and Ellman, 90 Va L Rev at
304 (cited in note 3); Sunstein, et al, Are JudgesPoliticalat8 (cited in note 3).
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judgment, making searching the decision database relatively
straightforward. 70 Although the method for finding the cases is
relatively simple, there is room for error. For example, an associate may have coded the case incorrectly. However, it can be confidently stated that the basic pattern of the results is sound. Additionally, this method has the benefit of including all immigration decisions of the appellate division of the Federal Court.
At the end of the culling process, a dataset of 873 published
three-panel immigration decisions of the Federal Court of Australia, and the associated votes of 2,619 individual judges, was
complied. Each case was then coded as either conservative (stereotypically Coalition) or liberal (stereotypically Labor), with a
stereotypical Coalition vote taken to mean voting to uphold government policy over granting asylum or refugee status, and a
stereotypically Labor vote taken to be liberal, meaning voting to
uphold the claim of the asylum seeker or refugee status seeker or
at least enabling a lower court to reconsider asylum or refugee
status.
The results of the study are as follows:
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF VOTES BY INDIVIDUAL JUDGES

(percentage of judges voting in a stereotypically conservative
manner in immigration cases)
Individual Judges' Votes
Appointing Party

Difference

Coalition

Labor

C-L

84.6

82.1

2.51

Table 1 shows the percentage of stereotypically conservative
votes by individual judges in immigration cases. The results
show that Coalition appointees vote conservatively (that is, in
favor of the government) in 84.6 percent of cases, while Labor
appointees vote conservatively in 82.1 percent of cases. This suggests that ideological voting (in the sense that Coalition appointees are more likely to vote in the stereotypically conservative
fashion, that is, for the government, than are Labor appointees)
70 The author is a former Federal Court of Australia associate, and while there is no

formal source specifying that associates undertake the task, the author affirms the convention.
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occurs on the Federal Court, at least in immigration cases. Ideological voting is measured by subtracting the percentage of conservative Labor votes from the percentage of conservative Coalition votes; the larger the resulting number, the larger the party
effect. The overall difference is 2.51 percentage points. That is,
Coalition appointees are more likely to vote in a stereotypically
conservative manner than Labor appointees, a statistically significant difference at the 0.9 level and in the expected direction.
This finding indicates that the attitudinal model may have some
explanatory power in the Australian context.
This finding is important because it highlights the possibility of attitudinal decision making more broadly in both Australia
and Westminster legal jurisdictions. However, it also suggests
the possibility that ideology plays a significantly less important
role in judging in Westminster legal systems than in the United
States. In their 2006 study on attitudinalism in the United
States Courts of Appeals, Cass Sunstein, David Schkade, Lisa
Ellman, and Andres Sawicki found that, across an aggregate dataset of twenty-three substantive legal topics (including abortion,
gay and lesbian rights, sex discrimination, and campaign finance), the overall difference was 12 percentage points.71 That is,
across all topic areas, Republican appointees (stereotypically
conservative appointees) are 12 percentage points more likely to
vote in a stereotypically conservative way than Democratic appointees (stereotypically liberal appointees). 72 However, when
the data was disaggregated, the extent of the effect was highly
variable across the topic areas. 73 A difference of 2.51 percentage
points, then, is significantly less than the 12 percentage points
present in the United States. Two important questions remain:
why the effects are not larger in Australian immigration cases,
and whether this limited, albeit statistically significant, effect
might traverse both topic areas and jurisdictions.
One possibility is that, in the topic area of immigration, the
law is far more clear and binding than anticipated and therefore
ideological disagreement is often implausible. Indeed, it is possible to hypothesize that, in a tightly written statutory regime
such as Australia's migration statute, the clear language of the
statute, as well as established precedent on any provision in
question, might dampen any ideological differences between con71 Sunstein, et al, Are Judges Politicalat22 (cited in note 3).
72 Id.

7

Id at 24-57.
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servative and liberal appointees. Consequently, judicial professionalism may trump ideology, with precedent and statutory language acting as a dampener on ideological preference. Relatedly,
it could be that the number of truly hard cases is minimal in the
Australian immigration context and that disagreement can only
really manifest itself in these visible, but numerically small, instances.
Another possibility is that in the case of immigration appeals, even if there is room for differing statutory interpretation,
conservative and liberal appointees do not actually disagree on
the appropriate principles that should be applied in determining
statutory meaning and intent. Empirical work in the criminal
context in the United States suggests that Republican and Clinton appointees do not actually differ in their decision outcomes.74
The criminal cases provide a neat comparison for immigration
cases in Australia: in both the criminal context and immigration
context, individuals will appeal even where no uncertainty in the
law exists because they are not paying for the appeal (which is
true in most cases in US criminal appeals and Australian immigration appeals). (Indeed, faced with either incarceration or detention and deportation, individuals in both situations have
nothing to lose and everything to gain by continuing to progress
their claims up through the appellate system.) Consequently,
many immigration appeals lack merit under the statute and
precedent and the opportunity for ideological differentiation is
limited. Relatedly, if a strong claim is presented by an individual
appellant, conservative appointees will likely agree with her,
even if there is some scope in the statutory scheme for ideological
differentiation. Legal professionalism, then, could be constraining judicial culture in a number of ways to dampen ideological
effect in the area of immigration appeals in Australia.
A third possibility is that the attitudinal model has less explanatory power than other models of behavior in the Australian
and Westminster contexts. Judicial behavior might be better explained and predicted in Westminster legal systems by, for example, which party is in power; that is, judicial decision making
might be constrained by, and thus responsive to, the controlling
majority party in the legislature. At least in the context of constitutional challenges to federal legislation, a recent study has
demonstrated that the probability of the US Supreme Court
74 Nancy Scherer, Are Clinton's Judges "Old"Democrats or "New"Democrats?, 84
Judicature 151, 154 (2000).
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striking down a liberal law was constrained by whether the
Democratic Party or the Republican Party held Congress. 5 While
this possibility is certainly worth further investigation in subsequent studies, in light of the above alternate possibilities, it is
difficult to make any definitive conclusion without exploring the
applicability of the attitudinal model across a wider range of topic areas in both Australia and other Westminster legal jurisdictions more generally.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This preliminary investigation suggests that the hypothesis-that attitudinal judging exists in Westminster legal systems
despite the continued contrary assumption-should be tentatively accepted. Although these findings are preliminary and a significant amount of study and analysis needs to be done before the
hypothesis is fully accepted, the preliminary study suggests that
attitudinal voting is not implausible in a Westminster jurisdiction, and highlights an issue worthy of further investigation.
The next step, then, involves the design and formulation of a
complete dataset in Australia that includes a significant number
of topic areas against which to test the original hypothesis. Possible case types include sex discrimination, racial discrimination,
disability discrimination, corporations cases where appellants
sought to pierce the corporate veil, and income taxation appeals.
Each of these case types represents policy areas where reasonable minds may differ, and there is a clear policy divergence between the liberal and conservative parties in Australia. Importantly, each of these statutory regimes affords judges far
more discretion than under the Migration Act, presumably allowing more scope or opportunity for ideological voting.
In designing a large and diverse dataset for testing the hypothesis in Australia, it is important to keep in mind what this
preliminary study is designed to test. Given that the goal of the
study and project is to determine whether judicial behavior in
Westminster legal systems is attitudinalist in nature, and to
formulate a more universal theory of judicial decision making, it
is important that at least some of the topic areas selected for
analysis in the Australian proxy study can be analyzed in other
Westminster jurisdictions.
75 See Anna Harvey and Barry Friedman, Pulling Punches: Congressional Constraintson the Supreme Court's ConstitutionalRulings, 1987-2000, 31 Leg Stud Q 533,
555-56(2006).
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Further, in addition to examining the voting behavior of individual judges, future research should incorporate more subtle
measures of judicial behavior, namely panel effects. That is, future studies should ask whether a federal judge votes differently
depending on the political ideology of her panel colleagues. Studying conformity and polarization will only increase our understanding of judicial behavior and enhance the likelihood of a
more universal theory of judicial behavior.
VI. CONCLUSION
The standard assumption about the voting behavior of
Westminster judges is that their decisions are a result of the application of a priori formal rules. The purpose of this Article was
to ascertain the veracity of this long-held assumption by asking
whether, instead, Westminster judges are animated, at least to
some degree, by personal political ideology. Using as a proxy
immigration decisions in the Federal Court of Australia, the Article finds that ideology is evident in the voting behavior of Australian judges. While not denying the constraining effect of the
law more generally, this finding indicates that ideology does in
fact matter. This result is both surprising and exciting, and, if
the results hold once the scope of the study is broadened, arguably has the potential to enliven new and interesting debates over
both the descriptive and normative institutional role of the judiciary in Westminster legal systems.

